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1. As a practical matter, the development of law in the form of enacted
legislation often does not keep pace with societal change. At first glance, this fact
seems somewhat disturbing since the law, according to some philosophies, should
reflect social consensus. However, this is neither remarkable nor cause for concern.
The law's processes are deliberative, involving time-consuming public testimony and
debate. Thus, the law often plays "catch-up" with social change. This reactive
rather than pro-active decision-making is generally desirable as the law is likely to
change to reflect well-considered social judgments rather than passing social
fancies. This column briefly examines one area of the law -- copyright in digital data
-- in which legislative change has been particularly slow, discusses why such change
has been slow, and considers the implications of the lack of congressional action in
this area for the judiciary and private parties.
2. In the area of electronic communications, the law has lagged behind
technological developments for some time. This time lag itself is not a matter for
concern. Electronic technology changes quickly and the law, as an institutional
matter, simply cannot change as fast. Moreover, because new technology has
revolutionized communications, it has been appropriate for the law to wait until the
technology evolves to a state at which lawmakers can both understand it and apply
consistent legal principles to the issues it raises. Hastily conceived legal
adjustments are particularly inadvisable in the technological arena for the practical
reason that even "bad" laws, once enacted, are hard to undo.
t (D 1997 by the Trustees of Boston University. Cite to this column as 3 B.U. J. SC. & TECH.
L. 8 (1997). Pin cite using the appropriate paragraph number. For example, the first paragraph of
this column would be cited as: 3 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 8 para. 1 (1997).
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3. In keeping with a deliberative approach to legislation, the Clinton
Administration has attempted to craft carefully its technology policy.
2 It
established the National Information Infrastructure ("NII") Task Force to study the
intellectual property system -- particularly copyright law -- and to make
recommendations for legislative change.3 The Administration sought to enhance the
accessibility of the NII and the quality of data available on it. After two years of
public hearings and public comments, the NII Task Force issued its 1995 White
Paper: "Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights." The White Paper
comments on a variety of topics and suggests changes to the copyright laws to
further the Administration's goals.4 Shortly after the White Paper's issuance, both
the Senate and House introduced legislation to enact its suggestions. 5 Since that
time, both bills have stalled as parties with diverse agendas squabble over the
advisability of particular provisions.
4. One of the most contentious issues preventing the legislation's passage is
one on which both bills as originally drafted were silent. Both online service
providers ("OSPs") and Internet access providers ("IAPs") have been seeking explicit
provisions in the bills which would exempt them from liability for the copyright
infringement of their subscribers.
5. Current law on this issue is based on an extension of longstanding judicial
interpretations of the Copyright Act6 in the hard copy world to the electronic arena.
Taken together, the Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA7 and Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Frena8 cases suggest that a bulletin board system operator ("BBS") may be held
2 See Exec. Order No. 12,864, 3 C.F.R. § 634 (1993), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994).
3 See Intellectual Property, Information Policy, 46 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (DNA)
449 (1993).
4 INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (Sept. 1995) (commonly referred to as the White Paper because of the white
paper with which the report was bound, which distinguished it from the preliminary draft that had
been bound in green paper).
5 See H.R. 2441 and S. 1284, 104th Cong. (1995) ("National Information Infrastructure
Copyright Protection Act"). The 104th Congress did not act on these bills and the 105th Congress
has yet to introduce them.
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, 1001-1010 (1994).
7 857 F. Supp. 679, 686-87 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
8 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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liable for the infringing conduct of its subscribers even where it is unaware of the
infringement. These cases are consistent with traditional copyright law holding
distributors liable where the goods they sell infringe a copyright even though the
distributors themselves may not know, or even have a reasonable opportunity to
know, of the infringement. 9
6. However, in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communication
Services, Inc., the court held that an LAP is not directly liable for copyright
infringement where it merely installs and maintains the system which
automatically forwards messages received from subscribers. 10 The court based its
holding on lack of causation: "Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there
should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a
defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party. "1 1
7. It is difficult to reconcile Sega and Frena with the Netcom case. It is true
that the IAP in Netcom did not know of or encourage the infringement, while the BBS
operator in Sega actively encouraged infringement by urging subscribers to upload
Sega games. 1 2 However, the BBS operator in Frena did not know of the
infringement, provided services roughly similar to that of the Netcom BBS operator,
and yet was held liable.
13
8. Against this backdrop, OSPs and IAPs objected to the draft legislation
because of what it did not provide -- a legal clarification of the conflicting caselaw
that provided for an exemption or at least a limitation on liability of BBS operators
for infringing conduct by subscribers. In part to address the concerns of OSPs and
LAPs, the committees revised the bills to provide, inter alia, a safe harbor for service
providers who, on request of the copyright owner, immediately remove or prevent
access to allegedly infringing material.
14
9. The fight between copyright owners and OSPs and LAPs continues, and
may delay enactment of the proposed legislation. Despite this delay, and the legal
uncertainty regarding system provider liability, the OSP industry continues to
9 See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN ET AL., COPYRIGHT § 9.4, at 9:16 (2d ed. 1996).
10 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-70 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
11 Id. at 1370.
12 See id. at 1371. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pubrg, Inc., 939 F. Supp.
1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following the Frena court in finding defendant liable for copyright
infringement because maintenance of a web page went beyond providing Internet access by offering
defendant's product for sale).
13 Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370-71.
14 See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. § 1203(c)(4) (1995).
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expand. 15 This suggests that providers have adjusted their prices or terms of service
to account for the legal risk that they will be held liable for copyright infringement.
10. In fact, many OSP contracts shift the cost of copyright infringement to the
wrongdoer -- the subscriber who uploads infringing material. 16 Standard terms
provide for the OSP's right to terminate service if the subscriber uploads copyrighted
material without the consent of the copyright owner. 17 Additionally, subscribers
agree to indemnify the OSP for losses arising from the subscribers' copyright
infringement.' 8 These terms often accompany the software, are reproduced in the
user manual, or are provided to the user electronically the first time the user loads
the software.
11. In the wake of the ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg19 case, standard form
contracts and their indemnification provisions are likely to be enforceable. ProCD
was the first case to uphold both the validity of a shrinkwrap-type contract and
particular terms thereof in the consumer context. 20 ProCD distributed CD-ROMs
containing telephone directory listings and search and retrieval software.2 1 ProCD's
license agreement was encoded on the CD-ROM, reproduced in the manual, and
appeared on the screen each time the user ran the software.2 2 Many OSP's seek to
bind the user to standard form contracts in a similar manner. To the extent that
they currently take different contracting approaches, they may change their licensing
practices to conform to ProCD's to enhance the probability that their licenses will be
upheld.
12. In ProCD, the particular contractual term upheld by the Seventh Circuit
was a use restriction. The purchaser of the consumer version of ProCD's product
agreed not to use the data contained therein for commercial purposes.2 3 The court
15 See Richard Bowers, 66.6 Million Online Households Worldwide by 2000, NEWSBYTES, Nov.
19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12027249.
16 See 907 F. Supp. at 1375-76 (exploring Netcom's contractual relationship with subscriber).
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
20 See id. at 1452 (describing three other cases dealing with shrinkwraps and contending that
they do not directly address shrinkwrap enforceability or consumer transactions).
21 See id. at 1449.
22 See id. at 1450.
23 See id.
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found the restriction to be reasonable under the circumstances. The court viewed the
agreement to the use restriction as the price the consumer user paid for the benefit
of an overall lower price for the software package.2 4 Commercial users who were not
bound by the use restriction paid much more for the product.
2 5
13. The standard OSP contractual prohibitions requiring subscribers not to
upload copyrighted data without the consent of the copyright owner and to indemnify
the OSP for any loss caused by breach of that provision are not directly comparable
to the ProCD use restriction. The OSP provisions are at once more and less
troublesome. They are more troublesome because the subscribers may be
unwittingly exposing themselves to potentially large indemnification liability.
However, given the fact that it is the subscriber's own wrongdoing that would
implicate the indemnification provision, this allocation of the risk does not seem
unreasonable. The provisions are less troublesome because they can be assessed
strictly as a matter of contract law. They do not implicate the copyright preemption
issues that the use restriction does.
14. There was a tenable argument that the ProCD use restriction,
irrespective of its enforceability as a matter of contract law, should be preempted
under copyright law.2 6 It is a fundamental tenet of copyright law that facts are not
afforded copyright protection. 27 However, compilations of facts may merit copyright
protection if their selection and arrangement is sufficiently original.28 In ProCD, the
court treated the database of listings as uncopyrightable because it lacked
originality.2 9 The contractual use restriction, therefore, effectively functioned to give
24 See id. at 1449-50 (noting that ProCD engaged in price discrimination, charging consumer
users less than commercial users). The ProCD court stated:
ProCD ... [sold] its database to the general public for personal use at a low price.... If
ProCD had to recover all of its costs ... by charging a single price.., it would have to raise
the price substantially.... If because of high elasticity of demand in the consumer segment
of the market the only way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial
users alone, then all consumers would lose out....
Id. at 1449. The court went on to note that for ProCD's price discrimination scheme to work, it had
to prevent consumer users from reselling to commercial users and undercutting ProCDs own price.
The use restriction effectively safeguarded the price discrimination scheme. See id. at 1450.
25 See id. at 1449.
26 See id. at 1453-55.
27 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-47 (1991).
28 See id. at 347.
29 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1447 ("We may assume that this database cannot be copyrighted.").
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ProCD greater rights than it had under copyright law and, by extension, the
consumer user fewer rights than it would have had if the contract had not modified
the terms of the Copyright Act.
15. The copyright preemption issue, while not critical to information conduits
like OSPs and IAPs, is of paramount concern to both software and database
providers. These vendors often attempt to modify through contract the copyright
rights that would otherwise apply. For example, software providers often include
contractual terms prohibiting decompilation, while the Copyright Act grants limited
decompilation rights to users as part of their statutory fair use rights.30 Database
providers, like ProCD, often include contractual terms requiring users to treat data
as if it were copyrighted, when in fact it may not be copyrightable subject matter.
16. There is substantial academic literature discussing the preemption of
particular contractual provisions that modify the copyright rights otherwise
applicable to software. 3 1 There is much less written on the question of whether or
not private parties can contract to create their own "private" copyright-type rights to
apply to data -- such as ProCD's factual compilation -- that is not protected by the
Copyright Act without fear of preemption. ProCD suggests that they can.
17. The ProCD court stopped short of adopting a per se rule that all contracts
will survive a copyright preemption analysis. 3 2 However, it did state that generally
contracts should withstand a preemption challenge since they create only rights
30 See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting
section 107 of the Act to permit decompilation under certain circumstances); accord Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31 See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, Essay: Contracts, Copyright, and Preemption in a Digital World, 1
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995) (arguing that without changes to copyright law, parties will find it
increasingly necessary to rely on private contract to protect their rights); Mark Lemley, Intellectual
Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995) (suggesting modifications in the
Uniform Commercial Code to address conflicting intellectual property and freedom of contract
interests); Michael Liberman, Overreaching Provisions in Software License Agreements, 1 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 4 (1995) (focusing primarily on the contractual protection of the intellectual property rights
of the licensor, limitations on such protectionism posed by federal copyright law, and instances
where the license agreement may be unenforceable due to overreaching); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License
Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995) (arguing that fair use rights should be alienable and exploring
factors that should be considered in deciding whether circumstances exist in which these otherwise
alienable fair use rights should be held inalienable, preempting contractual provisions to the
contrary); David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of
Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineeriiig, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543 (1992) (showing
that it is critical to understand how federal patent and copyright law independently and differently
limit state creation of rights in intellectual property).
32 86 F.3d at 1455 ("[W]e think it prudent to refrain from adopting a rule that anything with
the label "contract" is necessarily outside the preemption clause.").
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between the contracting parties, not copyright-type rights against the world.
33 The
ProCD decision then offers some level of certainty to vendors that the standard form
contracts they employ will be enforceable even as to those terms which modify
federal copyright law.
18. This may help to explain the legislative inaction with respect to H.R.
3531. 3 4 While H.R. 3531 is not based on recommendations by the NII Task Force, it
does deal with the information superhighway from the perspective of database
providers. The bill would create a new form of protection for databases by statute.
35
The impetus for the bill was, in part, the perceived inadequacies of current judicial
interpretations of the Copyright Act that deny copyright protection to factual
compilations lacking in originality. One of the objectives of the bill is to encourage
investment in assembling databases by ensuring that the database owner receives a
return on its investment under the new statutory scheme since it may not receive
that return under the Copyright Act. However, to the extent that database providers
are able to create rights through the mechanism of private contract, their perceived
need for the legislation declines. The ProCD preemption holding then may lessen
the urgency with which database providers seek a new form of statutory protection.
19. Thus, the ability of electronic information providers to contract effectively
with their customers may be partly responsible for the relative lack of speed with
which Congress has addressed statutory changes to regulate electronic information.
To the extent that electronic information providers remain free to enter into
agreements with their customers that create "custom copyright," their incentive to
lobby for legislative change is reduced.
20. This does not compel the conclusion that legislative delay in this area is
desirable. The judiciary has been forced to adapt copyright and contract doctrine
from the hard copy world into the soft copy one without congressional guidance.
Congressional inaction has largely delegated policy decisions, including how to
balance competing interests, to the courts. Yet the courts do not conduct public
hearings or listen to public testimony in the same way that Congress does. Nor are
the courts accountable to the electorate in the same manner. While the NII Task
Force was a good starting place for pointing Congress to issues of concern, its
momentum has largely been lost.
33 See id. at 1454 ("A copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by contrast, generally
affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do not create exclusive rights
[and therefore do not create rights equivalent to any of the exclusive copyright rights].").
34 H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) ("Database Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy
Act of 1996").
35 See id.
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21. Moreover, while the ProCD decision may make it less critical for software
and database providers to press for legislative action, the user community still has
a stake in having its voice heard. It is not at all clear that users are in favor of
enforcing standard form contracts that modify the copyright rights to which they are
accustomed in a hard copy context. While it is true that extensive hearings were
conducted both before and after the issuance of the NII White Paper, ProCD raises
new issues that should be fully aired as a part of any comprehensive revision of the
Copyright Act to deal with electronic information.
22. Thus, while legislative inaction did not seem particularly troublesome
even in the relatively recent past, the time has come for a full airing of the issues
involved in the development of an information based economy. Those issues include
the question of how copyright law should be applied in this new forum, and how
copyright and contract fit together. In the absence of legislative deliberation, private
parties will continue to render the Copyright Act largely irrelevant in the electronic
medium by contracting around it. At the same time, the judiciary will substitute for
the legislature in stretching old concepts to deal with new questions.
23. This does not suggest that parties should have no ability to contract
around the Copyright Act. However, since Congress has specific legislative goals
that it intended to achieve through the Copyright Act, it should at least consider the
impact that contracting around the Copyright Act has on those goals. At the end of
the day, Congress may make no change in the law, but at least that inaction will
represent a considered legislative response rather than an abdication of legislative
duties.
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